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This article presents a novel approach to the analysis of wireless sensor networks (WSN) security, based on the regulations
intended forwireless communication devices. Starting from the analysis and classification of attacks, countermeasures, and available
protocols, we present the current state on secure communication stacks for embedded systems.The regulation analysis is based on
civil EN 50150 and MIL STD-188-220, both applicable to WSN communications. Afterwards, starting from a list of known WSN
attacks, we use a correspondence table tomatchWSNattackswith countermeasures required by regulations.This approach allows us
to produce a precise security evaluation and classificationmethodology forWSN protocols.The results show that current protocols
do not present a complete coverage of security issues. While this conclusion is already known for manyWSN protocols, to the best
of our knowledge this is the first time a complete methodology is proposed to base this assertion. Moreover, by using the proposed
methodology, we are able to precisely identify the exposed threats for each WSN protocol under analysis.
1. Introduction
Security assessment of a wireless sensor network (WSN)
protocol is a critical issue for a wide range of applications,
increasingly pushed by the Internet-of-Things trends. WSNs
present peculiar characteristics regarding security feature
implementation, because their applications generally address
low-energy and battery powered embedded devices, in which
the main requirement is to minimize the computational
power. Therefore, security attack countermeasures should
be implemented with careful attention, due to the limited
resources in the system.
This paper aims at identifying a set of measures that
should be taken into account while choosing or designing
a communication protocol for WSNs, in order to achieve
system security and low overhead at the same time. We start
with an analysis of themain issues related to security in sensor
networks (even if the considerations could be extended to all
battery-powered radio devices) where resources are limited
and their optimization is a mandatory requirement.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 offers an
introduction to the main security issues in WSN. Section 3
identifies a WSN attack taxonomy and classifies attacks
within OSI layers. Section 4 describes regulations and stan-
dards that can be applied to secure wireless sensor networks.
In particular, we analyze the rules adopted in the EN
50159 civil standard and in the military MIL STD-188-220D
w/Change 1, along with an overview of Common Criteria
validation methodology. In particular, Section 4.3 offers an
overview of relevant validation criteria for wireless connec-
tivity, especially referring to Common Criteria validation
methodology and how it can be applied to WSNs. Section 5
reports the mapping of WSN attacks to countermeasures,
and finally in Section 6 we use the proposed methodology to
evaluate and classify popular WSN protocols, showing their
limitations regarding security issues.
2. Background
Differently from other approaches [1] that classify security
issues depending on WSN application, the methodology
and results we propose want to address a wide range of
common WSN security issues and link them to the lowest
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communication layers, that are in common with all protocols
and not specific to a single application.
There are three features intended to be addressed while
dealing with a secure protocol in WSNs [2]:
(i) secrecy: data on the WSN must not be spread to
foreign actors;
(ii) authentication: a method to identify members autho-
rized to join the network;
(iii) message replay protection: a technique to avoid data
inconsistency caused by replayed messages.
WSNs are very peculiar from the point of view of security,
since they can be subjected to a huge range of vulnerabilities,
but at the same time they have few resources to face them.
Actually, WSNs are affected by all the known vulnerabilities
of a linked network, with the addition of the following:
(i) vulnerabilities due to the transmission medium: elec-
tromagnetic communications are more accessible
than wired ones.
(ii) vulnerabilities due to unprotected physical access: a
node can be easily captured and should not contain
critical information in its program/data memory that
could break the whole network.
(iii) vulnerabilities due to noncentralized network infras-
tructure: a centralized authority could be used to
certificate authenticity of each node.
(iv) vulnerabilities due to limited resources: low computa-
tional capabilities, low power available, and limited
number of data transmission/reception.This is one of
the main constraints for security.
Depending on the nature of the attacker, vulnerabilities
can be classified as follows [3]:
(i) passive: the attacker listens to the medium and sniffs
exchanged packets. This kind of attack is difficult
to detect but has no denial of service (DoS) conse-
quences;
(ii) active: this kind of attack has the purpose of altering
packet routing, gaining authentication, and interact-
ing with the WSN. The attacker can be an external
node, that is, a node that does not belong to the
network but is capable of interacting with it, or an
internal one, that is, an authentic but compromised
node. This kind of attack can result in a DoS.
Moreover, the attacker can perform different kind of
activities depending on his capabilities that can be classified
as follows:
(i) sensor-class: the malicious node has computational
capabilities similar to a network node;
(ii) laptop-class: the malicious node has computational
capabilities superior than a network node.
If an attacker can propagate aDoS by compromising other
members of the network or moving through the network,
the attack is called Dynamic DoS (DDoS). Two main groups
of DDoS attacks can be identified [4]:
(i) mobile: the attacker can physically move through the
network. In this case a malicious node attacks its
neighbors, and then it moves to another position and
attacks its new neighbors.
(ii) propagation: the attacker spreads the center of DoS
to infect other nodes. Each infected node affects its
neighbors. Variants of this scheme can leave some
nodes not infected (e.g., malicious code may spread
through the network but it infects a node only after
two hops).
Most sensor network protocols feature self-organization
of the network and on-demand discovery of the path at
routing level; hence there are no problems if one or few nodes
cease to exist because of DoS attacks. Things change in case
of an increasing number of attacked nodes. Existing WSN
solutions completely break down when more than a certain
number of nodes are compromised.
End-to-end security mechanisms are generally too com-
putational expensive due to the limited resources available
in sensor networks. In [5], for instance, a location-based
resilient security approach (LBRS) is proposed through two
techniques: location-binding keys and location-based key
assignment. In [6] the authors adopt another approach, let-
ting a node communicate not only with his neighbor nodes,
but also with nodes at one-hop distance.This protocol allows
discovering, if needed, of alternative routing paths and also
offers a support for keys management and authentication.
3. Attack and Defense Taxonomy
In this section, we present taxonomy of attacks and common
defenses, classified by the communication layer at which they
are usually performed [7–9].
3.1. Physical Layer
3.1.1. Jamming. The purpose of this kind of attacks is keeping
busy the communication medium used by the network and
introducing RF interferences at the same frequency used by
the network. In some literature works they are also reported
as “collision” attacks related to link layer.
The result of jamming is that packets on air are damaged,
or they are never transmitted, if nodes have a collision
avoidancemechanismwhich reports an always busymedium.
A common defense to this attack is the adoption of
spread-spectrum techniques for transmission. Namely, there
are two different approaches:
(i) FHSS (Frequency-hopping spread spectrum), which
is somewhat resistant to an attacker who does not
know the hopping scheme, but it may be simply
tracked by scanning the transmission.
(ii) DSSS (Direct-sequence spread spectrum), which is
more efficient against this kind of attack, since it relies
on a wider RF spectrum.
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Both types of spread spectrum countermeasures may
be neutralized if the attacker is capable of performing a
wideband and high-power jamming attack.
3.1.2. Tampering. In this case the attacker gains physical
access to a node belonging to theWSN; for example, the node
may be physically destroyed or intentionally altered.
Defenses against tampering can be adopted at protocol
level (i.e., the communication protocol knows that some
node may be destroyed and is designed to keep the network
operational even in that occurrence) or at physical level, for
example, through geographical separation of nodes, cam-
ouflages, or antitampering node packaging. However, these
solutionsmay be expensive and easily bypassed if proper tools
are used.
3.2. Link Layer
3.2.1. Exhaustion and Interrogation. This attack is performed
by inducing a node to continuously retransmit a packet until
the battery of the node is exhausted. This is possible, for
example, in protocols that schedule a retransmission when
an acknowledgment packet is not received. However, each
part of protocol code that schedules a transmission may be
attacked and forced to induce exhaustion.
In the IEEE 802.11-based protocols, for example, Request
To Send (RTS) and Clear To Send (CTS) packets are used to
reserve bandwidth before data transmission. A compromised
node could repeatedly sendRTS packets in order to elicit CTS
packets from a targeted neighbor node, consuming battery
power of both nodes. In other protocols, an attacker node
sending “path discover request” may induce exhaustion if the
malicious node that continuously sends this kind of requests
induces the receiving node to respond.
A defense against this type of attack can be implemented
by limiting the number of transmissions even to authenti-
cated nodes.
3.3. Network Layer
3.3.1. Hello Flood. Many protocols use an exchange of Hello
messages to verify neighborhood.This attack exploits routing
protocols that require periodic Hello packets to be transmit-
ted to announce the presence of a node. In the “hello flood”
attack, the attacker broadcasts a high powerHello to all nodes
and let them think he is a neighbor.
This attack can be avoided by verifying link bidirection-
ality, assuming that a legitimate node has the same radio
capabilities of other WSN nodes. Authentication may be
another solution.
3.3.2. Wormhole. Two distinct malicious nodes usually
implement this attack. It consists in tunneling packets from a
malicious node that sniffs packets to a remotemalicious node
with long-range radio.
In case an attacker node uses the same hardware platform
of the other nodes in the network, a defense against this attack
could be implemented by designing a reduced radio range, in
order to achieve the required coverage but at the same time
avoiding remote replies. A more general countermeasure
adopts a geographical routing scheme with timestamps
inserted into packets. This measure adds information about
node position in each packet that can be used to compute its
Time Of Flight (TOF), hence rejecting packets coming from
“too distant” nodes.
3.3.3. Sinkhole. In a sinkhole attack, amalicious node attracts
traffic from a particular area. All traffic of the area is
diverted to the attacker node. The attack is accomplished
by compromising the routing algorithm in order to induce
source nodes to see a particular node always as “next hop.” In
that way all traffic will be redirected through the malicious
node. If it never forwards packets to neighbors, the attack
would be called black hole. The black hole [10] attack can
also be issued selecting a node with a homing attack (see
Section 3.3.7) and then physically tampering it.
The attack can be avoided using route algorithms resistant
to an arbitrary configuration or using a geographical routing.
3.3.4. Sybil Attack. In this attack, themalicious node assumes
multiple identities. This kind of attack undermines a dis-
tributed solution counting on cooperation. It may be used,
for example, to break a cryptographic distributed scheme.
Networks can be defended from the Sybil attack by
location verification routines, to be sure that a node is really
there where it claims to be, or with proper authentication
method to avoid identity fraud typical of this attack [11].
3.3.5. Bogus Routing Info orMisdirection. This class of attacks
is focused on altering routing information in several ways,
for example, modifying routing packets exchanged between
nodes. In on-demand routing protocols that schedule an
answer to a path discover request, an attack called misdirec-
tion can be done with a malicious node replying fake info to
the requesting source.
Another kind of bogus routing attack is the ack spoofing
attack.Themalicious node sends false acknowledgemessages
to each packet-request that sniffs even if it is not the recipient.
As a consequence, a weak link can seem strong or a dead node
can seem alive even if it is not [12].
Defenses against this kind of attack can be implemented
authenticating nodes that send updating route info, while a
refresh mechanism may avoid keeping corrupted route data
in the network.
3.3.6. Selective Forwarding. A malicious node linked to the
network can selectively drop certain packets, usually to favor
a route direction. This attack is also known as “Neglect and
greed.” This kind of attack also provides the possibility of
altering message priority.
Defenses against this kind of attack can be implemented
by using multiple nonjoined routing path obtained using
different algorithms.
3.3.7. Homing. This kind of attack is based on theanalysis
of traffic patterns in order to identify and target nodes that
have special responsibilities. For instance, in a geographic
routing scheme, the analysis could allow an attacker to figure
out where important nodes are, such as cluster-heads or
cryptographic-key managers.
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Figure 1: Interconnection of a WSN with remote human interfaces
via proxy.
A defense against this attack can be implemented by
encrypting headers as well as content [13].
3.4. Transport Layer and Above. Vulnerabilities at transport
and higher layers are introduced a wireless sensor network
is interfaced with IP-based networks. Up to this point we
consideredWSNprotocols that do not necessarily implement
an IP-based communication. Note that from this layer to
onwards, the typical security issues of IP-based communica-
tions become part of the issues of theWSN architecture; since
they are common to IP networks, they will not be addressed
in this work.
Figure 1 shows the usual architecture to interface a WSN
to the internet, where a proxy linked to an interface node
provides access to the WSN. Proxy can be configured in two
ways [14]:
(i) as a relay of commands received by remote users
toward the WSN;
(ii) as a data storage system, in which the proxy collects
data from WSN and stores them in a database, while
users perform query on proxy database to read sensor
network data.
The limited standardization in the WSN world and the
consequent huge variety of protocols let foresee that it is
impossible to design general proxy architectures. So, each
proxy will have vulnerabilities linked to the specific sensor
network it refers to. However a proxy is potentially dangerous
for the existence of the WSN itself if configured as a relay,
since a malicious user able to gain proxy authentication,
could, for instance, flood messages through the WSN and
performan exhaustion attack.On the other hand, a proxy that
implements a standard interface for a database is exposed to
common database attacks. In both cases, if the proxy fails, for
a remote user there is no way to access WSN data.
A particular approach consists in introducing redun-
dancy at proxy level, since it could be the bottleneck of the
network, through the adoption of a delay tolerant architecture
[15]. In this architecture, several proxies are interconnected
and store each incoming/outgoing message, spoofing each
other database. No active link is needed among proxies
and data is delivered when connectivity is available. A
transposition of this concept at LLC layer is analyzed in [16].
4. Relevant Standards in Embedded
Wireless Communications
In this sectionwe report the standards that are considered rel-
evant for wireless communications for embedded devices. In
particular, we focus on the civil standard [17] EN 50159, with
particular emphasis in threats and the military MIL STD -
188-220D w/Change 1 [18] that focuses on a particular imple-
mentation of countermeasures. Then we report the standard
evaluation criteria used for computer system security, and
we identify a complete list of countermeasures applicable to
wireless sensor networks, with particular consideration for
asynchronous communications.
4.1. EN 50159. EN 50159, also issued as IEC62280, addresses
a huge range of security issues for safe communications in
railways systems. In particular, “Part1” and “Part2” detail
security issues for closed or open, nontrusted transmission
systems [17].The standard does not include particular specifi-
cations regarding onwhichOSI layer should implement these
requirements. The protocol architecture could address each
security issue at higher layers, that is, at application level, as
well as at lower layers.
In WSNs and embedded networks in general, constraints
on power consumption and low computational capacity lead
to the diffusion of these requirements through the whole
protocol definition, in order to optimize available resources.
In EN 50159-2 the following threats are listed:
(1) repetition: this include the replication of packets,
called also duplication;
(2) deletion: a whole packet or just part of it disappears;
(3) insertion: an arbitrary formatted message sent by
unauthorized node arrives at the receiver;
(4) incorrect sequence: in multipacket communications
this happens when the receiver is unable to recon-
struct the correct message ordering;
(5) corruption: message data has been corrupted during
transmission;
(6) delay: the delay increases over acceptable value;
(7) masquerade: this threat happens with authentication
errors and also when mixing safety-related messages
with non-safety related ones;
Moreover, in the analysis conducted by [19], based over
theHAZOPmethod [20], three threats are added to the above
list:
(8) excessive jitter: it is the time-displacement of the
packet, both in transmission or reception, from its
ideal timing;
(9) inconsistency: two or more receivers may have incon-
sistent view of transmitted data or receivers may be in
different states when starts receiving the same packet;
(10) too earlymessages: amessagemay arrive to destination
before the receiver is “ready to receive”.
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4.2. MIL STD-188-220D w/Change 1. MIL STD-188-220 is a
military communication standard first released in May 1993,
while the latest revision “D w/Change 1” was released in June
2008 [18].
The standard, approved by the US Department of
Defense, defines protocol architectures for inter- and intra-
communications within Digital Message Transfer Devices
(DMTDs) that take part to Command, Control, Communica-
tions, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. In particular,
it defines the lowest communication layers for DMTDs,
including wireless embedded devices that take part to the
network.
Since it is a military standard, the main focus is on
reliability of the protocol. In particular MIL STD-188-220
describes the physical and data-link layers of the communica-
tion stack used inwireless devices to exchangeVMFmessages
(Figure 2).
Here we analyze some of the defense mechanism imple-
mented in this protocol, starting from the lowest communica-
tion layer, focusing on mechanisms related to asynchronous
transmission and on Communication Security (COMSEC)
issues, embedded in the communication protocol descrip-
tion.
The transmission frame derived from the standard is
reported in Figure 3.
Excluding phasing and postamble fields, used for bit-
synchronization and end-of-transmission flagging, our atten-
tion will be focused on transmission synchronization and
data fields. They are specified as in Figure 4.
The most important fields related to security issues are
(i) frame sync: the standard frame sync and robust frame
sync are mutually exclusive;
(ii) The robust frame format: used only when imple-
menting the robust communication protocol, which is
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a 7 bit flag that specifies format for the current frame.
In particular it refers to the convolutional coding,
data scrambling, and packetizing according with the
Multidwell Protocol described inside the standard;
(iii) message indicator (MI) subfield is a stream of random
bits that are redundantly encoded using bit-patterns
at physical level. Cryptographic synchronization is
achieved when the receiver acquires the correct MI.
(iv) transmission word count, which is a 12 bit value calcu-
lated by the transmitting station to inform the receiv-
ing station of the number of 16 bit words contained in
the transmission.
As for the securitymechanism, at data-link layerMIL 188-
220 adopts the following strategies:
(i) Golay forward-error-correction is applied as FEC
method. It can be implemented with a feedback shift
register, with feedback connections selected accord-
ing to the coefficients of a polynomial function 𝑔(𝑥).
It is applied to code the transmission word count,
message indicator, and transmission header field;
(ii) time dispersive coding is applied on sixteen 24 bit
Golay-encoded words ordered to form a matrix. The
matrix is then rotated in order to change the bit-
sequence. Each block contains a total of 16 FEC code-
words. It is applied to the transmission word count
and transmission header fields;
(iii) data scrambling is applied before FEC coding. It is
usedwhenmediumhas noDC response and the data-
sequence to transmit has long NRZ strings (§5.3.15
[18]);
(iv) convolutional coding generates three output bits for
each input information bit, in order to increase
error correction capabilities during reception, using
a Viterbi decoding algorithm and hard decisions;
(v) frame check sequence is used for error detection. All
frames include a 32 bit FCS prior to the closing flag
sequence, according to ISO 3309;
(vi) precedence: two level-of-precedence bits (L-bits) are
used to indicate precedence of data in the information
field. The precedence values used in data-link layer
can be mapped to precedence values related to net-
work layers with static mapping;
(vii) Sequence numbers;
(viii) network access control adds robustness introducing
functions related to timing. It adds “network busy
sensing,” “response hold delay,” “timeout period,” and
“network access delay” functions in the MIL 188-220
protocol stack. When using robust communication
protocol these parameters are modified to achieve
greater robustness;
(a) network busy sensing is performed at physical
level. Its sensing-time can vary according to
preamble length;
(b) response hold delay is a time that the addressed
receiving station waits before sending a
response. It is applied during coupled ack
handshakes. Since its actual value can be
calculated only in the receiver station, the
source node can only use a prediction of this
value. According to the frequency hopping
provided by the HAVEQUICK II protocol [21],
a time-window is allocated for transmission
without interruptions. When ack-messages are
used, the ack timing is not known a-priori. This
mechanism adjusts the response transmission
time and delay parameters in order to meet,
where the length of packets allows it, a single
hop-window;
(c) timeout period starts after the transmission of
packets that require an ack. It is a time-window
that allows response reception by a source node;
(d) network access delay (NAD) is defined as the
time that a station with a message which is
ready to be sent waits after the time period
timer has expired. The standard provides six
different schemes to compute this value. Net-
work access delay is always an integer multiple
of the Network busy sensing time. All transmis-
sions, except acknowledgments, should begin
at the start of the next NAD slot. It could be
significantly longer due to extended equipment
preamble times, especially for COMSEC opera-
tion with HAVEQUICK II hopping protocol;
(e) multidwell Protocol defines a series of mecha-
nisms to increase redundancy inside packet bit-
stream and packet reconstruction from various
source nodes. For example, packet is structured
with a “start of packet field” and a “segment
counter” with a coded number that stand for
the number of 64 bit “data segments” that will
be contained in the packet. Transmission is
assumed to be one hop, when the receiver
detects a “start of packet,” it opens a receive time
slot. If a frequency-hop is detected during trans-
mission, a handover procedure starts to allow
reception from the new transmission frequency.
Overhead is added to the bit-stream in order to
include Majority choices (2 out of 3 or 3 out of
5) according to the expected BER.
This list of countermeasures adopted byMIL 188-220 will
be kept as a reference for the construction of a complete
countermeasure list for WSNs.
4.3. Validation Criteria. In this section we expose validation
methods used for evaluating computer system security. We
aim at finding out methodology guidelines for validation of
security countermeasures in WSN systems.
Common criteria (CC) for Information Technology
Security Evaluation [22] are international standard coded
also ISO/IEC 15408. It offers a framework to evaluate and
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certificate security in IT products and systems. It comes out
from three preexisting standards: ITSEC [23], CTCPEC [24],
and the “orange book” TCSEC [25].
The following paragraphs contain a description of the
framework key-points. In the following, the “target of evalua-
tion” (TOE) is the system to be evaluated in its security claims.
Usually a user community or government institution
creates a protection profile (PP), that is, a collection of
security requirements for a class of IT products. It can be
focused on a target user or a particular application of the
TOE.
Security target (ST) describes a set of properties of the
specific TOE that fulfill the requirements that are expressed
in one or more PPs.
Three groups of actors are involved in the security
evaluation.
(i) Consumers. They express security and protection
requirements in an unambiguous manner for an
implementation-independent system that can flow in
a PP.
(ii) Developers. They express security requirements of
their implementation in a ST (implementation depen-
dent). This ST may be fully compliant or not with
some PPs.
(iii) Evaluators. CC describes the set of general actions
the evaluators have to carry out, but does not specify
procedures.
Evaluation is conducted against countermeasures
reported in ST. Two kinds of countermeasures are classified
in the framework, countermeasures related to the TOE
that must be verified and countermeasures related to the
operational framework (safety, operational environment,
etc.) that are not verified.
Evaluation of the countermeasures adopted to defend
assets from threats goes through two steps.
(i) Evaluation of counter measure sufficiency. The ST
describes the adopted countermeasures as security
objectives. These are detailed in security functional
requirements (SFRs), written in a standardized lan-
guage, described in Part II of [22]. Evaluation of
ST sufficiency is then determined applying to SFRs
Security Target Evaluation Criteria, Part III of [22].
(ii) Evaluation of countermeasure correctness. If
adopted countermeasures are correct, threats are
cancelled. Security assurance requirements (SARs)
detail requirements needed to fulfill correctness.
Evaluation of correctness is then determined by
applying SARs to “evaluation evidences,” that is, to a
series of tests that can be heterogeneous and various
in their nature.
According to the criteria exposed above, our work pro-
poses that a wireless communication protocol should deal
with SFRs related to “class FCO communication,” that is,
“nonrepudiation of origin” (FCO NRO) and “nonrepudiation
of receipt” (FCO NRR) that are dependent on “user identifi-
cation” (FIA UID). In a wireless sensor network the wireless
Table 1: Defense methods versus CC requirements.
SFRs Counter measure
FCO NRO Source and destination identifier in each message
FCO NRR Feedback messages (ack messages)
FIA UID Membership control-bus guardian
FDP ITT Safety code
FDP ACC Identification procedure-address filtering
FDP IFC I/O are physically defined in RF circuits
FDP IFF Handshake in PtP link
FDP UIT Timeout; timestamp; shared network identification
medium and the implemented protocol can be addressed as
an “internal communication channel” of the “wireless sensor
network” TOE.These enlarge SFRs to “internal TOE transfer”
(FDP ITT) and “Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protec-
tion” (FDP UIT).
The first SFR has dependencies with “access control
policy” (FDP ACC) and “information flow control functions”
(FDP IFF). This last one inherits itself dependencies from
“Information flow control policy” (FDP IFC). An exhaustive
description of SFRs is present in [22] part 2.
The complete validation of a protocol with CC is out of
the scope of the article, but criteria are taken into account
as reference to increase security requirements of a model of
WSN TOE and list countermeasures needed to accomplish
such requirements. Results are presented in Table 1, where a
list of requirements is considered against adopted counter-
measures.
This analysis points the light to the need of having an
accurate flow control and an active logic on the node that
dynamically scans anomalies in received packets.
4.4. Standard Countermeasures List. The analysis of threats
conducted in [19] leads to the defense methods reported
in Table 2, showing the adoption of a particular defense
method against one or more of specific threats. The analysis
with respect to the standard validation criteria reported in
Section 4.3 points out the completeness of a countermeasure
against the threats considered in a regulation.
Threats discussed in this standard are quite general
and can be addressed to a wide range of communication
protocols, not just wireless ones.
5. WSN Attack Mapping
We can link the considered threats list (Section 4.4) to the
attack taxonomy used in WSN (Section 3). Table 3 summa-
rizes this idea. A “X” in the table should be interpreted as “the
threat (left column) can cause the attack (upper line).”
Table 3 aims at defining a reference matrix betweenWSN
attack taxonomy and EN50159 threats. It can be taken as ref-
erence to introduce the required defense methods in a WSN.
For instance, if we want to address the “Sinkhole” threat we
find that we need a defense against “Deletion” and “Delay.” All
related defense method for “Deletion” and “Delay,” reported
in Table 2, are suitable to contrast “Sinkhole”.
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Table 2: Description of defense methods against threats.
ID Defense method Used againstThreat (§IV.A)
A Sequence numbers in each message 1; 2; 3; 4
B Time Stamp of the sending time 1; 4; 6
C Timeout for reception windows 2; 6
D Source and destination identifiers in eachmessage 3
E Feedback messages (ack messages) 3; 7; 9
F
Identification procedure about the
members identity before a single
transmission or at system boot
3; 7
G Safety Code in messages (es.CRC) 5
H Cryptographic techniques 5; 7
I Redundancy, that is, message periodicreplication 1; 2; 3; 4; 5
J
Membership control: members monitor
each other to discover malfunctions.
Exception code handling is performed in
positive case.
8
K
Atomic Broadcast: transmissions are
broadcasted to all target nodes in the
same order
8
L
Time-Triggered architecture: messages are
scheduled also with a time-priority
handler
1; 2; 4; 5; 8; 6; 10
M
Bus Guardian: access to the transmission
channel is controlled by a hardware that
avoids simultaneous access.
1
N Prioritization of messages: prioritizationof messages based on their content-type 8; 6
O
Inhibit messages: transmitted messages
can’t be re-transmitted before a timeout
period
1; 6; 8
P Hamming Distance scheme application tonode address and message identifiers 3; 7
Particular attention should be mentioned for the tamper-
ing attack, as it comes out that tampering is not a common
attack covered by regulations. This could be due to the “drop
and forget” nature of aWSNnode and to the reduced physical
dimensions. As from Section 3.1.2, possible countermeasures
against tampering attacks are
(i) dynamic routing, which consists in a routing protocol
that does not use static routing tables, but can rear-
range routing on-the-fly, if required;
(ii) antitamper enclosure, which is a physical counter-
measure that aims at detecting physical node manu-
missions. Since this is a physical countermeasure, not
related to the protocol stack, it will not be introduced
in Table 2.
Using data in Table 3 along with those expressed in
Table 2, it is finally possible to link a full set of counter-
measures to WSN attacks taxonomy. Results are presented in
Table 4. The number in each cell represents the multiplicity
of countermeasures that react to the same kind of attack.
Moreover, in Table 4 notation symbols code the defense
method nature according to the following list:
(i) ∗—countermeasures related to packet formatting;
(ii) ∗∗—countermeasures that impact handshaking;
(iii) †—countermeasures related to numeric manipula-
tion and transformation of packets;
(iv) ‡—countermeasures that act on physical handling of
packets;
(v) #—countermeasure that act on queuing policies;
(vi) ##—countermeasures related to nodemonitoring and
identification;
(vii) $—directives on routing scheme.
This last classification will be used during the layering of
each countermeasure, that is, the introduction of a particu-
lar countermeasure into a specific communication protocol
layer.
6. Security Analysis Applied to
Representative WSN Protocols
In this section we apply the correlations reported in Table 4
to analyze the security solutions available in representative
and widely known WSN protocols, thus, using the protocols
as application examples for the methodology proposed in
previous sections. For sake of clarity, we specify that some
of them have not been specifically designed to face security
risks, nonetheless, due to their popularity, they are analyzed
according to our methodology.
We group the protocols taken as case studies according to
security features:
(A) intrusion detection and intrusion tolerance protocols:
this class refers to features related to detection and
tolerance of intrusions;
(B) routing layer protocols: this class refers to routing
protocols. A general overview is available in [12];
(C) whole atack protocols: protocols of this class offer
countermeasures at several layers.
An overview of each analyzed protocol follows.
6.1. Intrusion Detection and Tolerance Driven Protocols
6.1.1. AODVSTAT. TheAODVSTAT [26] protocol introduces
a tool into the node to monitor network packets and detect
local or distributed attacks within its radio range. The
protocol has two modes of operation. In stand-alone mode,
a sensor detects attacks within its immediate neighborhood
only. In distributed mode, sensors periodically exchange
UPDATE messages containing details of near nodes. More
precisely, UPDATE messages contain the list of known
MAC/IP pairs, the number of hops to known nodes in the
network and information regarding detected local attacks.
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Table 3: Connection table between WSN attacks taxonomy and EN50159 threats.
Threat
Attack
Jamming Tampering Exhaustion andInterrogation
Selective
Forwarding Misdirection Sinkholes Wormholes
Sybil
Attack Flooding Homing
Repetition X X X X
Deletion X X X X X
Insertion X X X X X
Incorrect
sequence X X
Corruption X
Delay X X X X X X
Masquerade X X
Excessive
Jitter X X X
Inconsistency X X X
Too early
messages X X
This information is then used to detect attacks in a distributed
fashion.
AODVSTAT is a sophisticated algorithm for the detection
and reaction to a great variety of potential wireless network
attacks; unfortunately it is quite computationally expensive.
6.1.2. Effective Intrusion Detection Using Multiple Sensors.
This method adopts cooperative and distributed detection
algorithms [27] to support intrusion detection, an intelligent
routing of intrusion data throughout the network and a
lightweight implementation. This is a nonmonolithic system
and employs several sensor types that perform specific
functions. The control agent is deployed only into a part
of network nodes in order to impact performances of only
a reduced set of nodes. Data from these sensors are then
merged to discover intrusions and try to inhibit the attack.
6.1.3. INSENS (Intrusion Tolerant Routing Protocol for WSN).
INSENS [28] constructs forward tables in each node to
facilitate communications between sensor nodes and a base
station. This protocol does not rely on detecting intrusions,
but rather tolerates intrusions bypassing themalicious nodes.
It reduces damages done by intruders by limiting flooding
and using appropriate authentication mechanisms, based on
symmetric-key cryptography. Moreover it allows alternative
network routes to be established between non-malicious
nodes. While not providing a real intrusion detection, but
rather intrusion tolerance, it still requires a certain number of
wireless sensor nodes completely dedicated to this purposes.
6.2. Routing Layer Protocols
6.2.1. AODV. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector is a popular
reactive routing algorithm. It is also the routing scheme
adopted by ZigBee [29].
When a node of the WSN receives a packet addressed to
an unknown destination, it starts sending a “route discovery”
packet. This message is flooded through the network until
a receiving node finds an entry in its routing table and
answers to the request. Each flooded message sets on the
receiving device a path in his routing table, since the source
of the received message is an in-sight node. In that way, when
the message reaches the discovered destination, a backward
path is already set.
This kind of protocol introduces a lot of traffic overhead
due to path discover flooding. If an attacker log in a relay
proxy and is able to generate path discover requests, asking
for bogus addresses, a lot of messages overhead will be
generated, performing in an easy way an exhaustion attack.
6.2.2. TORA. The temporally ordered routing algorithm
(TORA) is an adaptive routing algorithm stacked over the
internet MANET encapsulation protocol (IMEP).
TORA logically organizes the WSN nodes as a DAG
(directed acyclic graph) using both proactive and reactive
path discovering schemes [30].
TORA supports on-demand path discovery very similar
to AODV. The protocol uses a particular optimization to
perform pro-active routing and adjust the height of the DAG
through WSN nodes [31].
This protocol inherits weaknesses of AODV, but limits
flooding of “path search” messages with respect to it. Mali-
cious packets spread through the network may compromise
the delicate logical organization of aDAGand generate a huge
packet overhead to recover the scheme.
6.2.3. DSR. The dynamic source routing protocol (DSR) is
a flow oriented routing protocol based on mechanism of
route discovering and route maintenance [32]. The route
discovering is an AODV-like path discovering mechanism.
It is used when the source of message has no entry in its
routing table for packet destination. If source node has an
entry to route the message, but an intermediate node fails
delivering to a next-hop node, routemaintenancemechanism
is activated. Negative ack messages are sent backward to
the source and each hop-node which receives that message
10 Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
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Table 5: Minisec performances compared to other protocols.
Payload (B) Packet overhead (B) Security overhead (B) Total size (B) Energy (mAs) Increase over TinyOS
TinyOS 24 12 — 36 0.034 —
TinySec 24 17 5 41 0.0387 13.9%
SNEP 24 20 8 44 0.0415 22.2%
MiniSec 24 15 3 39 0.0368 8.3%
deletes the incorrect entry in its routing table. When the
source receives a negative ack, it chooses another routing
entry and restarts the delivery process. If no other routing
entry is available to the destination then the source starts a
path discovering process. MAC layer inherited or DSR-level
ack messages may be used according to protocol version.
DSR points on reducing flood of messages but is logically
susceptible to the same vulnerabilities of AODV.
6.3. Security-Oriented Protocol Stacks
6.3.1. ZigBee. ZigBee defines a security layer based on IEEE
802.15.4 [33]. Three security levels span from no security to
encryption of data and security command frames from/to
each node.
Particular features of security functions implemented in
Zigbee are
(i) it maintains a counter on incoming and outgoing
messages to implement reply protection;
(ii) number of integrity bit in a frame can be chosen from
0 to 128;
(iii) authentication and encryption can be chosen between
two modes, one key shared from all nodes or one
key for each pair of nodes. This last case has a higher
memory cost;
(iv) a node can become a “trust center” to provide security
keys.
6.3.2. SPINS (Security Protocols for Sensor Networks). This
protocol [34] is composed by two linked protocols, SNEP and
𝜇TELSA. They can be stacked together to become SPINS or
used separately. SNEP and 𝜇TELSA will be detailed in the
following paragraphs.
6.3.3. SNEP (Secure Network Encryption Protocol). This pro-
tocol provides security in node-to-node communications
[34]. Main security features it supports are as follows.
(i) Authentication. It computes and appends authenti-
cation codes to messages. The code is essentially a
cryptographically secure checksum.
(ii) Replay protection. It is implemented with counters
at each node. The checksum code mentioned in the
above point is calculated using a secret key and this
counter.
(iii) Semantic security. It is obtained refreshing the above
counter. In fact two identical messages will be
encrypted in two different ways if using different
sequence numbers.
6.3.4. 𝜇Tesla. This protocol [34] provides authentication in
broadcast communications with low packet-overhead. It sup-
port a loosely time synchronization among nodes. Receivers
verify that incoming packets have a valid time-signature
before storing it. Packets are disclosed immediately after the
node receives a key from the packet source node, which
periodically distributes them.
6.3.5. TinySec. This protocol implements encryption and
authentication. It operates in two modes [35]:
(i) authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE);
(ii) authentication only (TinySec-Auth).
In this protocol packets are partially encrypted, avoiding
encrypt/decrypt at each hop.
TinySec explicitly omits replay protection, recommend-
ing it to be performed at application layer.
TinySec has been incorporated in TinyOs releases. It
requires 728 bytes of RAM and 7146 bytes of program space.
The energy overhead imposed by TinySec is 3% for TinySec-
Auth and 10% for TinySec-AE.
6.3.6. MiniSec. While TinySec achieves low energy con-
sumption by reducing security countermeasures and ZigBee
implements good security features, but suffers for high energy
consumption,MiniSec [36]wants to obtain the best ofworlds,
low energy consumption and high security.
MiniSec has two operatingmodes, one tailored for single-
source communications and another tailored for multisource
broadcast communications.
In Table 5, authors of [36] offer a comparison of Minisec
against SNEP, Tinysec, and raw transmission with TinyOS to
show its low overhead.
6.3.7. ISA100.11.a. The ISA100.11a protocol has been devel-
oped by ISA100 committee, formed in 2005. In 2009 it was
announced the first release of ISA 100.11.a [37]. The stack is
based on the 802.15.4 physical/MAC layers [38] with a 10ms
TDMA scheme.The base version was extended to include the
following functions [39]:
(i) link-local addressing;
(ii) message forwarding;
(iii) PHY management;
(iv) adaptive channel-hopping to avoid occupied channels
(v) message addressing, timing and integrity checks;
(vi) detection and recovery of message loss;
(vii) clock synchronization.
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Authenticated by MMIC using DL key or global key
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Figure 5: ISA100.11a DPDU.
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Figure 6: WirelessHART DPDU.
Some of these features can be directly found in the
structure of data link layer protocol data unit (DPDU),
shown in Figure 5. The routing layer is realized with a graph,
several paths may be issued according to network traffic. The
transport layer it is based on 6LoWPAN, IPv6, and UDP.
The protocol is designed to be extremely flexible in terms
of layers composition, but nodes that implements different
version of this standard may not interoperate.
6.3.8.WirelessHART. Introduced into themarket in 2007 and
approved by the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) in 2010 as IEC 62591, the standard is based on the
HART “user layer” and the 802.15.4 physical/MAC layers
[38]. It introduces its characterization at data link and
network layer with several security oriented features that
are always turned on and cannot be disabled. In particular,
it offers channel hopping support, channel blacklisting (in
order to avoid busy frequencies), timing info to support its
TDMA implementation (with a fixed 10ms slot), AES-128
encryption, and dynamic routing (achieved via graphs and
time stamps). As stated in [40] WirelessHART implements
three security fields:
(i) message integrity code (MIC): this is a sort of CRC
code calculated over the whole payload and used
during authentication;
(ii) counter: a 4 byte counter used to create the crypto-
graphic nonce
(iii) security control byte: a header byte used to define the
used security features.
The protocol handles transmission failures through
retransmissions using dedicated and shared time slots
through different paths in the routing graph [40]. The
Network Layer in theWirelessHART protocol stack provides
three security services: confidentiality, integrity, and authen-
tication. We can find that some of these features directly
match its DPDU structure in Figure 6. WirelessHART and
ISA100.11a have several similarities since both are based on
802.15.4 physical/MAC layers and they differ mostly on the
layer level where they implement their features [39].
6.4. Protocol Case Study Comparison. Here we present a
chart which contains the countermeasures identified with the
methodology introduced in Section 5 against all the protocols
used as case studies. In Table 6, an “X”means that a particular
function/countermeasure is implemented by the protocol.
We can see that all the listed protocols offer some
kind of counter measures against security threats. Even
protocols not specifically designed for security offer some
points of strength. Some of the protocols address just a
specific communication need and implement only particular
countermeasures, relying on lower layers to integrate security
requirements. Usually this approach increases the stack
size and resources needed by nodes, since no cross-layer-
optimizations can be performed.
Protocols that face “intrusion detection and tolerance”
(Section 6.1) usually offer just particular features that let
them have only few crosses in Table 6. They are designed to
address particular needs; hence they have a limited range of
applications. Protocols specifically targeted to routing layer
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Table 6: WSN protocols comparison chart.
AODVSTAT Intrusiondetection INSENS AODV TORA DSR ZigBee SPINS TinySec MiniSec
ISA
100.11a WirelessHART
Sequence
numbers X — — X X X X X — X X X
Time stamp X — — X X X X X — X X
Timeout X — — X — — X X — X X
S & D identifiers X X X X X X X X X X X X
Ack X — — X X X X X — X X
Identification X X X — — — X X X X X X
Safety Code — — — — — — — X — X X X
Crypto — — X — — — X X X X X X
Redundancy — — — — — — — — — — X X
Monitoring X X X — — — — — — — — —
Atomic
broadcast X — — — X X X — — X X X
Time-triggered
architecture — — — — — — — X — — X X
Bus guardian — — — — — — X X — — X X
Prioritization X — — X X X X — — — X X
Inhibit messages — — X — — — — — — — X X
Hamming
distance — — — — — — — — — — — —
Dynamic
Routing X — X X X X X — — — X X
∗ ‡ $$
(Section 6.2), namely AODV, TORA, DSR, gain some crosses
in the table even if they are not security specifically designed
for security issues. Protocols reported in Section 6.3 are an
example of stacking, since they offer several countermeasures
diffused over many protocol layers. Even if all countermea-
sures are still not covered, Zigbee and SPINS show good
results regarding countermeasures coverage. This is achieved
at the expense of stack weight, since few interlayer optimiza-
tions are possible. In fact, a complete secure Zigbee protocol
stack may exceed 100 kb size of program memory. The most
recent standards (ISA100.11a and WirelessHART) achieve
the best coverage. They seem to offer a robust and secure
stack, introducingmost of their countermeasures at data-link
layer, while inheriting other layers [41] from interoperable
standards. In particular, all security countermeasures are
native in WirelessHART and cannot be disabled, remarking
how this protocol has been designed to be secure.
Nevertheless, it is possible to see from Table 6 that
none of the protocols contains a full implementation of the
countermeasures identified in Section 4; however we remark
that WirelessHART and ISA100.11a have a full coverage
against the threats analyzed even if they are not covering all
countermeasures.
These observations lead to the following conclusions:
(1) regulations sometimes require more than one coun-
termeasure against the same threat;
(2) none of the analyzed protocols has a full countermea-
sure coverage;
(3) the coverage is usually obtained through several
firmware stratifications and relying on lower com-
munication layer functionalities, with no interlayer
optimization.
We also want to remark that facing all security issues at
the lowest communication layers could not even be possible
for some embedded platforms that offer a limited access to
hardware driver functions.
According to these conclusions, the choice of implement-
ing a communication stack fully customized can introduce
the following advantages:
(i) covering all countermeasures;
(ii) offering a lightweight implementation through
intralayer optimization and sharing of functionalities.
These main directives should be kept as guideline to
design security in protocols dedicated to low-power devices.
7. Conclusions
We presented an overview of general security issues for
WSNs and introduced attack taxonomy to catalogue common
attacks. The proposed taxonomy is built by analyzing attacks
and countermeasures related to eachOSI layer involved in the
communication, from the physical to the transport layer.
Then we focused on existing standards and in particular
the civil EN 50159 and the military MIL STD-188-220D
w/Change 1, to find out suitable countermeasures, solutions,
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and architectures. In order to validate the countermeasure
list, an evaluation of the common criteria regarding wireless
protocols was produced. In particular these criteria offer a list
of security requirements that a generic “target of evaluation”
has to fulfill according to its functionalities.
The complete list of countermeasure was finally mapped
in conjunction with the taxonomy introduced for wireless
and ad hoc mobile sensor networks. As a result, all identified
attacks in WSN have been linked to a countermeasure.
Finally, we applied the methodology to the evaluation of
popular protocols for wireless sensor networks.The common
characteristic we found is that security functionalities are
spread between several layers.This generally affects the proto-
col by decreasing performances, since security implemented
in this way introduces an overhead that can hardly be reduced
through optimization and sharing of functionalities.
None of the analyzed protocols covers all security require-
ments, but the most recent ones seem to cover all threats.
In particular, WirelessHART also seems to point out a
lightweight solution and a degree of inter-layer optimization.
Future work will leverage on this study to design a new
WSN protocol, specific for homeland security and in partic-
ular for areamonitoring and threats recognition applications,
in the view of overcoming all the identified security issues.
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